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I) INTRODUCTION 
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Quilter v The Attorney-General' is 
unfortunately destined to become a foundation block in this countries 
jurisprudence on anti-discrimination. It is unfortunate not only for the result, 
which was perhaps inevitable'.!, but for the process that the court used to 
interpret section 19 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act l 990 (the Act) 
relating to discrimination. In its decision, the court seemingly ignored the 
rapidly expanding body of international and foreign jurisdiction law on the 
issue of determining whether discrimination exists. It then proceeded to 
apply antiquated tests that have proved incapable of meeting the very 
objectives that anti-discrimination law is aimed at achieving. 
This paper's purpose is to examine the process that the court used to apply 
section 19 in Quilter and to discuss why that process is not appropriate to 
achieve the aims of anti-discrimination legislation. What this paper is not 
going to attempt is a full exposition of Quilter and its result , it will 
concentrate almost exclusively on the issue of discrimination and the 
corresponding findings. 
f n order to enable a meaningful discussion of the discrimination aspects of 
Quilter it is necessary to first establish the principle of anti-discrimination 
law. Focus is then switched to the cases of Northern Regional Health 
Authority v Human Rights Commission & Race Relations Conciliator3 and 
Wheen v Real Estate Agents Licensing Board:~ to discover the processes that 
New Zealand courts have used to ensure this principle is achieved. These 
processes will then be analysed in light of foreign jurisprudence to determine 
which provides the best way of achieving the principle. Then the case of 
I [ 1998] 1 NZLR 5'.!3 
'.! See below 
3 Unreported, High Coun, Auckland. CP 157/97, 9 Jui} 1997. 
-l4 HRNZ 15. 
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Quilter is analysed in regards to discrimination and the findings will be 
discussed. 
II) DISCRIMINATION 
''Discrimination is unacceptable in a democratic society because it 
epitomises the worst effects of the denial of equality, and discrimination 
reinforced by law is particularly repugnant. The worst oppression will result 
from discriminatory measures having the force of law ."5 
This strong statement by McIntyre J. of the Supreme Court of Canada 
epitomises current international thought on discrimination and is the 
principle that the relatively recent growth of international human rights law 
is based apon. However, the statement is rendered almost meaningless if 
discrimination itself has no definition. This may seem to be counter-intuitive 
as it is easily assumed that everybody knows what constitutes discrimination. 
Unfortunately a closer examination of the history of anti-discrimination law 
highlights the fact that there are a multitude of different opinions on what 
constitutes discrimination. For section 19 of the Bill of Rights to have any 
real effect it must be applied in a way which the objectives of anti-
discrimination law are met, and these objectives in turn must be based on the 
underlying principle. 
A) The Principle of Anti-Discrimination Law 
Anti-discrimination as an ideal must itself be based on another more deeply 
rooted and intuitive principle to provide it with meaning and purpose. This 
'meta-principle'6 must provide the content of the anti-discrimination law. In 
effect the existence of this meta-principle relegates anti-discrimination law 
from the position of a principle of law to a tool to be used by the law to effect 
5 Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia I 1989) 56 D.L.R ( 4th) I , 17. 
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the meta-principle. Thus the identification and definition of this meta-
principle is vital to the understanding of anti-discrimination law and its 
application. 
While many ideals can be promoted as embodying this meta-principle,7 there 
can be no doubt that true equality of humans is the most widely held and 
promoted ideal. However, stating that equality is the meta-principle does not 
advance our understanding of anti-discrimination law far enough. The 
questions must be asked, what is equality? Is it equal application of the law? 
Is it treating everyone as equals? Or is it some other form of equality? 
Obviously a law that treats everybody as equals is going to seriously 
disadvantage certain groups of people due to the simple fact that everyone is 
not equal. Equal application of the law is also intuitively wrong. It 
automatically assumes that the law is able, if applied equally, to result in 
equal opportunities and protections being given to all humans regardless of 
physical and personal characteristics. Surely the focus should be on the 
substance of the law itself and reliance should not be put on the process of 
applying the law to provide true equality. 
Thus the meta-principle of true equality emerges as a principle that states that 
humans to be given the same opportunities and protections as a result of the 
law , as opposed to under the law. Often equal treatment under the law will 
also result in equal treatment as a result of the law. However this is not 
always the case and there are situations where the law will have to 
differentiate between groups of individuals to ensure that they are treated 
equally as a result of the law. 
It must be noted that some writers do not agree with this concept of a meta-
principle and believe that anti-discrimination is a basic principle in its own 
6 As it is referred Lo in Christopher McCruuden ed. "The International Library of Essays in La\\ & 
Legal Theory: Anti-Discrimination La\\" ( 1991 ) e\\ York Uni\-crSily Press , p ,Yiii . 
7 For example liberty , justice, community and more utilitarian Yiews such as greatest good for the 
greatest number. 
J 
• 
I 
[ J 
J 
[ J 
.. J 
4 
right, without reference to any other ideals.8 However these writers tend to 
define the anti-discrimination principle very narrowly and in regards to racial 
issues only.9 Thus while the analysis used by these writers may be sufficient 
in that area, it is strongly arguable that a broad examination of anti-
discrimination requires a deeper look at what ideals lie behind the laws. 
B) The New Zealand Background 
There were two main cases on the issue of discrimination in New Zealand 
prior to Quilter. Both were decided in the High Court within months of each 
other and therefore they contain no references to one another. Surprisingly 
the judgements could not have been more different, they both applied 
different tests for discrimination which resulted in opposite findings on 
comparable situations. Perhaps this difference of approach is inevitable 
given the infancy of discrimination jurisprudence in New Zealand but it 
emphasises the need for a strong judgement based on the vast experience of 
international jurisprudence. The cases referred to are Northern Regional 
Health and Wheen. Each case will be discussed in tum with a focus on the 
process used to establish the existence of discrimination. 
1) Wheen v Real Estate A.gents Licensing Board 
At the date of the hearing Mr Wheen was an English citizen and a member of 
the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors. He held a Master of Science 
degree in urban land appraisal from the University of Reading and had 
practised as a real estate manager in England for some time. In 1993 he 
emigrated to New Zealand and applied to the Real Estate Institute for either a 
sales certificate or special dispensation due to his prior experience, either of 
which was needed to obtain a license to practice as a real estate agent in New 
Zealand due to the Real Estates Agents Act 1976. However at the time Mr 
8 Sec P::iul Brest "In Defence of the Antidiscrimination Principle" ( 1976) HarYard L:nv Re,·iew 90, 1. 
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Wheen applied for recognition, the Real Estate Institute did not have any 
process in place to recognise foreign qualifications (with the exception of 
Australia). As a result they refused Mr Wheens application and informed 
him that to obtain a license he would need to complete all of the pre-requisite 
courses required for a sales certificate. Mr Wheen subsequently complained 
to the Human Rights Commission stating that the lack of any process to 
recognise foreign qualifications amounted to indirect discrimination on the 
grounds of national origin. 
Indirect discrimination arose, he argued, because the lack of a procedure to 
recognise foreign qualifications effectively meant that a foreigner (trained as 
real estate agent overseas) would not be allowed to practice as a real estate 
agent in New Zealand, while a New Zealander (trained as an agent in New 
Zealand) would have no difficulty. His case was based on section 65 of the 
Human Rights Act which deals with indirect discrimination. The Human 
Rights Commission turned down his claim on the grounds of lack of 
jurisdiction. Mr Wheen then took to matter to the Complaints Review 
Tribunal. The Complaints Review Tribunal ruled in favour of Mr Wheen 
saying that the lack of this process did constitute indirect discrimination. 
They stated: 10 
... \\ here the claim is discrimination against a group, one looks to ascertaining e,actl1 
what effects the impugned action has, examining the effects across distinct groups .. . 
those groups will be ones relating to !he grounds. Thus, ir the claim is sexual 
discrimination, the groups will male and female. (Emphasis added). 
They then went on to state that if a difference of effect is evident then the 
onus will shift onto the accused to '·show good reason for there being the 
different effects." 11 Thus they established a two step 'analogous grounds' 
test. This test required the examination of the effect the action has on 
9 The issue of race is one of the most easily detectable and direct types of discrimination and therefore 
does not require a broad view of anti-di crimination objectives. 
10 Wheen v Real Hstmes Agents Licensing Board ( 1996) 2 HRNZ 481, 494. 
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categories (groups) of people analogous to the grounds of discrimination 
relied on. The board of the Institute then appealed the decision to the High 
Court and the High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal, basing the 
decision on a version of the formal equality test for discrimination. It must 
be noted at this point that the judgement recognised that" ... the precedent 
value of this decision will inevitably be somewhat diminished by the lack of 
opportunity to consider equally fully argument in opposition." 12 This was 
due to an legal administration formality that lead to Mr Wheen not appearing 
and not presenting any submissions. 
In a relatively short judgement dealing only in part with the issue of 
discrimination, the High Court stated that the Tribunals decision (and 
specifically the analogous grounds te t for discrimination) could not be 
logically sustained. In a short paragraph based primarily on equality under 
the law, not as a result of the law, the Court stated that in regards to the 
obligation to pass the pre-requisite exams to obtain a license: 13 
That obligation applied irre pccti, c to the national origins of the applicant ... The 
lack of a system for recognising [foreign] qualifications .. . applied equally to all 
applicants . .. The lack of a :,~:,tem for rccognbing o,ersea:, qualifications bore no 
more heavily on applicants of Ne\\ ZealanJ origin \\ ho might ha, e ac4uircJ 
4ualificalions merseas than on similarl1 4ualified applicants of an) other national 
origin. 
Thus the Court held that if a law applied equally to all people then it must (as 
a matter of logic) result in equal treatment and therefore an absence of 
discrimination. Unfortunately no mention was made of the effect that the 
law had on different categories of people, and the statement that the lack of a 
system bore equally on both foreign trained New Zealanders as it did on 
foreigners highlights the lack of regard for effect that the Court had. The law 
has the effect of disallowing foreign trained agents from practicing in New 
I l AbO\'C 11 JO, 495. 
12 Abmc n 4, '27. 
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Zealand. In almost every case, these foreign trained agents will be 
foreigners. Thus the law has the effect of disallowing foreigners from 
practicing as an agent in New Zealand without retraining which is often 
needless. However New Zealand trained agents (who are almost always 
New Zealanders) have no barrier to practice in New Zealand. Thus the lack 
of process has the effect of treating New Zealanders and foreigners 
differently. The High Court in Wheen stated that this does not amount to 
prima facie discrimination 
Cartwright J. in Northern Regional Health treats the matter very differently. 
The case was based on a very similar fact situation and as a result of using an 
effect based test, it was held that discrimination did arise and due to lack of 
good reason it was held to be unlawful. 
2) Northern Regional Health Authority v Human Rights Commission & 
Race Relations Conciliator 
Northern Regional Health relates to a notice issued by North Health in 
September 1993 that stated that they would not allow any more foreign 
trained doctors to practice in their jurisdiction unless patients special needs 
dictated that they do. This notice was in response to the growing number of 
doctors practicing in the area and the associated costs to North Health. Their 
objective was to reduce the number of doctors practicing in the area and to 
redistribute the current doctors. Dr Andreas was a foreign trained doctor 
who had previously worked in New Zealand and was registered with the 
New Zealand Medical Council. Under the notice issued by North Health Dr 
Andreas was ineligible to practice as a doctor in the area unless he completed 
a New Zealand undergraduate degree in medicine. Dr Andreas issued 
proceedings in 1996 against the Northern Regional Health Authority 
claiming that the notice constituted indirect discrimination and breached 
section 19 of the Bill of Rights. [n 1997 Dr Andreas pulled out of the 
13 AbO\ c n 4, ~9. 
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proceedings due to a lack of funds and was replaced by the Human Rights 
Commission and the Race Relations Conciliator. 
In a long and very comprehensive judgement Cartwright J. completed a 
detailed examination of international jurisprudence and concluded that the 
appropriate test to apply to determine the existence of discrimination was one 
based on the effect that the law had on analogous categories of people. 
Cartwright J. made some important points relating to discrimination that 
need to be noted. First she dismisses the claim that discrimination laws are 
for the purpose of solely protecting traditionally disadvantaged groups. 
While this may provide the focus (and indeed the justification) for the laws, 
they are intended to protect every person regardless of historical 
disadvantages. Secondly she recognises that it is the effect that the law has 
on people that must be taken into consideration. She then distinguishes the 
case Australian Medical Council v Wilson1-1 where the federal court of appeal 
applied a 'similarly situated' test to determine the existence of discrimination 
under section 9(1A)(c) of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Australia). 
She states that "luJnlike s 9(1A)(c) which requires that a comparison be 
made between the impact of a requirement on groups of the same race, 
colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, there is no attempt made in s 65 
I of the Human Rights Act] to indicate that the comparison must be made on 
that basis." 15 She goes on to say that "[b]y contrast, s 65 stands alone as a 
prescription for an analysis of indirect discrimination and permits a 
comparison between groups other than those of the same race, colour, 
descent or national origin."16 
Having established that a comparison must be made between the effect that 
the law has of different groups, she then outlines the criterion for 
categorisation and selection of the groups. She states: 11 
I~ (1996) 137 ALR 653. 
15 Above n 3, 33. 
16 Abo\'C n 3, 34. 
17 Abmc n 3, 34. 
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It docs not ... require an analysis to be made between members of the same group 
... The group\\ ith ,, hich those,, ho are unable to [practice medicine] because of their 
overseas training must first be compared is [sic] those who are trained in c,, 
Zealand. It is nccessar1 , hm,c,cr, to refine the groups bet\\een ,,hich the 
comparison is made. At !he core of each group must be !he very basis on which the 
discriminmion is asser1ed. [Emphasis added] 
As can be seen from this quote, Cartwright J. adopts an 'analogous grounds' 
test of discrimination where the examination focuses on the effect that the 
law has on different groups, chosen on analogous grounds to the ground of 
discrimination alleged. She holds that the facts of the present case constitute 
indirect discrimination in breach of section 65 of the Human Rights Act. 
She then states that after discrimination has been found to exist the onus 
(which was on the plaintiff to prove the discrimination) switches to the 
defendant to prove good reason for the discrimination. This good reason is 
based on a two step approach; there must be a genuine need for the objective 
used to justify the discriminatory action; and the discriminatory action must 
be suitable and necessary for obtaining that objective. In this case it was 
held that there was no genuine need for the policy and even if there was, the 
policy was not suitable or necessary for achieving the goal. 
Thus the two cases of Wheen and Northern Health provide two different 
approaches to the issue of whether discrimination exists. Wheen uses the 
formal equality approach to determine the existence of discrimination while 
Northern Health employs an analogous grounds test based on an effects 
based equality test for discrimination. To examine these two tests further the 
discussion now focuses on what processes foreign jurisdiction law has 
applied to achieve the principle of true equality in their law. 
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C) Foreign Jurisdictions 
This examination of how foreign jurisdictions have tried to give effect to the 
principle of true equality focuses mainly on Canadian jurisprudence. There 
are two main reasons for this. Firstly the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms contains in section 15 a guarantee of freedom from discrimination 
that follows the same structure of section 19 of the Bill of Rights. It also 
contains in section 1 a reasonableness clause equivalent to our section 5 in 
the Bill of Rights. It is one of the few foreign pieces of human rights 
legislation that contains such a reasonableness clause. The Charter in turn 
was based on the Canadian Bill of Rights 1970 which contained an anti-
discrimination clause almost identical in wording to the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights. For this reason the Canadian jurisprudence is extremely helpful in 
statutory interpretation. The second reason the Canada proves to be such a 
useful point of reference is because Canada along with the United States has 
perhaps had the most experience as a country in the area of discrimination 
cases. Thus they have compiled quite a number of major judgements in the 
area, not the least of which is Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia 18 
which will be referred to extensively in this section of the paper. 
After a broad examination of major cases in the area of discrimination it 
becomes apparent that there has been an evolution of thought that has 
spanned what can be categorised into four general areas; 'separate but equal', 
'formal equality', ' similarly situated equality' and ' substantive equality' . 
The term evolution may be slightly misleading as there is no clear 
progression from one area to another, and indeed devolutions of thought have 
occurred. However, for simplicity these areas of thought will be examined 
separately in the following discussion. 
18 Abmc n 4. 
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1) Formal Equality 
This area of thought was the one employed in Wheen. Formal equality is 
based on Dicey's principle of everybody being equal before the law. 19 Dicey 
stated that the law should be equally imposed and equally administered to all 
people. This idea of formal equality has intrinsic appeal until it is subjected 
to closer examination. It states in its most basic form that all humans are to 
be treated exactly the same in all circumstances. It states that in regard to the 
substance of the law, no one shall have a right or duty placed on them unless 
all other people are also subject to that right or duty. Procedurally it states 
that the law shall be applied equal to all people in all circumstances. 
However, the main failing of this ideal of equality is that while it ensures 
equality before the law, it fails to ensure equality as a result of the law. The 
reason for this failing is that it does not recognise that in reality people are 
not naturally equal. There are differences physically and emotionally 
between men and women, there are differences economically between 
established families and orphans, and particularly pertinent to this paper, 
there are differences socially between homosexuals and heterosexuals. 
These natural inequalities between humans will mean that a single law, 
applied equally to all people in both substance and process will result in 
different people being effected in completely different ways which in turn 
will result in discrimination. This type of discrimination is often referred to 
as indirect discrimination in that the law does not directly differentiate 
between people but rather indirectly differentiates through the inequalities 
produced by the result. In Dennis v United States, Frankfurter J. had this to 
say about the ideal of formal equality:'.!O 
It\\ as a \\ isc man \\ ho said that there is no greater inequaltt) than the equal treatment 
of uncquals. 
19 Sec Albert V. Dicey "Introduction to the Study of the urn of the Constitution" !Olh ed. (London, 
Macmillan, 1965). 
20 339 U.S 16'.;, 184. 
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Historically the law has used the white heterosexual male as its model of the 
person and has thus has ignored the differences inherent in women, blacks 
and gays. This definition of the person has therefore lead to a history (that is 
all to plain to see) of discrimination against women , blacks and gays. It is 
implicit in the idea of formal equality that discrimination will only be 
recognised in two situations; if the substance of the law relates only to one 
class of people; or if the process of administering the law is not applied 
equally to everybody. Unfortunately it is blind to the effect that the law will 
have on people, assuming that if the law is equal and applied equally than 
only equality can result. It is arguable that formal equality is the most basic 
idea of equality and that all of the following areas of thought have evolved 
from it. 
2) Similarly Situated Equality 
The similarly situated test for discrimination is a variant of the formal 
equality test. It is based on the Aristotelian equality principle that states that 
"things that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike 
should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness."2 1 In simpler 
terms , the similarly situated idea of equality is that every person to whom a 
certain law applies must be treated as equals by that law and have it applied 
equally with respect to the other people to whom the law applies. This idea 
of equality is different to the ideal of formal equality in that it allows 
different laws to be applied to different groups without discrimination 
arising. Therefore this test states that discrimination will only arise in one 
case; if the law is applied unequally within the group to which the law 
applies. 
However, this ideal of equality has an even deeper flaw that the ideal of 
formal equality. While it recognises that natural inequality between groups 
2 1 " Ethica Nichomacca" (19'25) , trans. W . Ross, 8 cx)k V3 , 113 la-6. A s quoted in Andrews v /11w 
Society of B.C. above n 4, 11 . 
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of people often necessitates the law to differentiate between those groups, it 
automatically assumes that any law which is applied equally to a particular 
group is not discriminatory. Thus it allows direct discrimination of certain 
types of groups. For example it would not see a law stating that women 
could not attend university as discriminatory unless it did not apply equally 
to all women. In other words, the presence of discrimination is determined 
solely on examination of the process of applying the law and not in the 
substance of the law itself. In Andrews McIntyre J. noted that the test, ·'ri If it 
were to be applied literally ... could be used to justify the Nuremberg laws of 
Adolf Hitler. Similar treatment was contemplated for all Jews."22 
Another way of interpreting this test is one of categorisation. What category 
of people should you compare the alleged victim of discrimination with to 
determine if there is discrimination? Intuition would say that you compare 
them with the category of people to whom the alleged discriminatory law 
does not apply. However this test compares the victim only with other 
people within the category that the victim belongs to , that is people to whom 
the law does apply. This in effect is comparing the discriminated with the 
discriminated and coming to the conclusion that since they are all 
discriminated against equally there is no discrimination. A rather absurd 
result, and one that has lead to this test being rejected by the Supreme Court 
of Canada in R. v Drybones.'23 In that case Ritchie J. was required to decide 
whether a provision in the Indian Act 1970 which made it an offence for an 
Indian to be intoxicated off a reserve was discriminatory against Indians. 
Previous cases on the same issue had been decided using an interpretation of 
the Canadian Bill of Rights provision against discrimination based on the 
similarly situated test and had held that there was no discrimination.2-1 In 
rejecting this interpretation of the anti-discrimination provision Ritchie J. 
stated: 25 
22 Above n 4, 11 . 
23 ( 1969) 9 DLR (3d) 473. 
24 Sec R \ Co11 -:.ales (1% '.?.) 3'.?.DLR ('.?.d) '.?.90. 
25 Abmc n '.?.3 , '.?.43 a4, quoted in Andrews, abm c n 4, I'.?. . 
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... I cannot agree with this interpretation pursuant to which it seems to me that the 
most glaring discriminatory legislation against a racial group ,,ould ha,·e lo be 
construed as recognizing the right of each of its individual members "to equality 
before the Im,", so long as all the other members arc being di eliminated against in 
the same way. 
After rejecting the similarly situated ideal of equality, the Supreme Court in 
Andrews then went on to outline an ideal known as 'substantive equality'. 
This ideal was far more advanced in its structure and represented a major 
evolution in jurisprudential thinking. 
3) Substantive Equality 
This school of thought was endorsed by Cartwright J. in Northern Health. It 
is based on the substance of the law and looks at the effect that the law has 
on people to establish whether it is discriminatory. Substantive equality 
therefore recognises that a law that treats everyone as equals and is applied 
equally to everybody can often be discriminatory if its effect on certain 
groups or individuals results in discrimination. Discrimination was defined 
in Andrews as:26 
.. . a distinction, \\'hether intentional or not but based on grounds relating lo personal 
characteristics of the individual or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens, 
obligations, or disadvantages on such indi, idual or group not imposed on others , or 
which withholds or limits access to opportunities , benefits , and advantages available 
to other members or society. 
Thus the substantive test for discrimination will recognise discrimination 
where there is an unintentional (or indirect) distinction between individuals 
or groups of people as a result of the law, the distinction having the effect of 
imposing burdens or obligations on the group or individual not imposed on 
others. It also recognises intentional (or direct) discrimination. An 
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important difference to note between the substantive test and the similarly 
situated test is that the categories for comparison are different. In the 
substantive test the alleged victimised group or individual is compared to a 
group or individual that is not subject to the alleged discrimination. This 
difference in categorisation is very important as it recognises that all people 
are deserving of .. equal concern, respect and consideration"27 no matter what 
group within society they belong to. Indeed, the ideal of substantive equality 
is analogous to the principle of true equality discussed above. It recognises 
that equality as a result of the law is what is required and focuses on the 
substance of the law to achieve this rather than the superficial equality ideals 
that focus on the process of applying the law. 
4) The Effect of the Reasonable Limit Provisions 
Finally the Court in Andrews turned their minds to the relationship between 
the provision in the Charter guaranteeing freedom from discrimination 
(section 15) and the section that states that infringements on rights and 
freedoms will be deemed legitimate if they can be proved to be a reasonable 
limit which can be "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society" 
(section 1). This discussion by the Supreme Court of Canada is of cardinal 
importance to New Zealand as the Provisions in the Bill of Rights (section 19 
regarding discrimination and section 5 regarding reasonable limits) 
effectively mirror those in the Charter. 
The issue arises because many people believe that the definition of legal 
discrimination has inherent in it a reasonableness factor. If not the argument 
goes, then every distinction that the law makes between people would be in 
breach of section 19 of the Bill of Rights and this would turn the right to 
freedom from discrimination into a hollow right. The often used example is 
the drunk driver. There can be no doubt that the law discriminates against 
26 Abo\'e n 4 , 18. 
27 Above n 4, 15 per McIntyre J. 
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intoxicated individuals by not allowing them the right afforded to sober 
individuals to drive. However, the distinction must be drawn between 
discriminating on the grounds of personal characteristics which is 'illegal' in 
terms of both the international and Canadian definition if legal 
discrimination, and discriminating on the grounds of an individuals 
behaviour, which is the basis for many of the examples advanced. However 
there are many cases of discrimination which are based on personal 
characteristics which society would deem reasonable and justifiable in a free 
and democratic society (such as a legal driving age which discriminates 
against young people) and that is why section 5 of the Bill of Rights exists. 
There are three main views on what role a 'reasonableness justification' 
section should have in determining the existence of illegal discrimination that 
are highlighted in Andrews. The first is that every distinction between 
individuals or groups as a result of the law should be considered a breach of 
the right to be free from discrimination and then the focus should switch to 
the justification section. Andrew Butler states in his article ··Same-Sex 
Marriage and Discrimination"28 that the approach to use is: 
... to hold that "discrimination" comprehends any "different treatment" bct\\Ccn 
persons on one of the prohibited grounds, and to examine whether there arc 
reasonable and objccti\'c grounds for any different treatment under s 5. 
In rejecting this view, the Court in Andrews agreed with the arguments of 
McLachlan J.A in the court below where she stated that to subscribe to this 
view would" ... elevates. 15 to the position of subsuming the other rights and 
freedoms defined by the Charter."29 This elevation would occur because 
without an evaluation of reasonableness within the definition of 
discrimination then all of the other rights and freedoms in the Charter would 
breach s.15 and would have to undergo a s.1 justification analysis. 
28 [ 1998] NZLJ June '2'29, '231. 
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The second view of how the sections inter-relate is that it is inherent in the 
definition of discrimination that only unreasonable distinctions will be 
regarded illegal discrimination. This view leaves the justification section the 
task of justifying otherwise unlawful discrimination as lawful in times of 
national distress such as war. This view was employed by McLachlin J.A. in 
the Canadian Court of Appeal decision in Andrews.3° 
The third view of how the sections inter-relate is known as the 'emunerated 
and analogous grounds' approach. This is the approach that was adopted by 
the Supreme Court in Andrews.3 1 as a response to the problem that if all 
distinctions between people as a result of the law are considered a breach of 
section 15 (or section 19 in New Zealand) then the courts would be forced to 
justify them under section 1 (or section 5 in New Zealand) to avoid anarchy 
and therefore in turn eliminate much of the usefulness of section 15. The 
Court in Andrews quoted Hugessen J. from the case Smith, Kline & French 
Laboratories Ltd v A-G. Can32 for an illustration of the analogous grounds 
approach: 
The answer, in my ,·iew, is Lhal Lhe Le,L or Lhe section itself contains ils o,, n 
limilalions. IL only prescribe discrimination amongst Lhc members of categories 
\\'hich are themseh cs similar. Thus the issue, for each case, ,, Ill be Lo knm, ,, h1ch 
categories arc permissible in determining similarit:y of situation and which arc not. It 
is only in those cases ,, here the categories thcmseh cs arc not permissible , ,, here 
equals arc not treated equally, that there will be a breach of equality rights . 
At first glance this test looks frighteningly like the similarly situated test for 
discrimination that we have rejected as inherently wrong. However, it states 
that the analysis of discrimination under this approach '"must take place 
within the context of the enumerated grounds and those analogous to them." 
This is not stating that like are to be treated alike and unalike to be treated 
29 Abme n 4, 8. 
30 Sec abm c n 4, 21 . 
31 See abo\'c n 4, 23. 
3'.! 2 DLR 591. As quoted in Andrews, sec abo,c n 4, 22. 
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unalike. What it does state is that the category to which the alleged 
victimised category must be compared is one which is analogous to it. For 
example a man complaining of discrimination based on sex must be 
compared to a woman and a black claiming discrimination based on race 
must be compared to a white. This comparison is a comparison of the effect 
of the law not the equality of the law or its application. Thus the justification 
section only applies after discrimination has been found by comparison of 
the effect that the law has on individuals in analogous categories. This 
analogous grounds test was applied in Northern Health by Cartwright J .. 
However, Keith J.'s judgement in Quilter shows that there can be a forth 
interpretation of what role reasonableness has to play. He seems to hold that 
the first step in applying the Bill of Rights is to determine whether it is 
reasonable for the right in question to even apply to the situation before 
deciding whether it is breached. Thus the question of reasonableness applies 
to the right, not the breach of the right. A closer examination of this will 
follow in discussion of his judgement below. 
D) Conclusion 
In conclusion to this section it is apparent that the ideal of substantive 
equality best represents the meta-principle of true equality that lies behind 
anti-discrimination laws. This ideal of substantive equality has been applied 
by both foreign courts (in Andrews) and New Zealand courts (in Northern 
Health) in the form of an 'analogous grounds' test. This test identifies 
discrimination when the impact that the law has on different groups (who are 
categorised on grounds analogous to the alleged ground of discrimination) 
has the effect of treating one of the groups adversely in comparison with 
another. 
This ideal of substantive equality is an evolution of earlier ideals such as 
formal equality and similarly situated ideals. These ideals have been shown 
to produce inequalities between people when applied by the courts and thus 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
[ I 
~ I 
[ I 
,1 
,I 
1' 
I 
19 
have no place in modern jurisprudential practice. Unfortunately however, 
the use of the formal equality test in the case of Wheen shows that without 
international assistance, New Zealands understanding of anti-discrimination 
laws is behind the rest of the worlds and has not evolved to the point 
required. Thus Quilter takes on extra importance as it chooses between the 
progressive and modern approach adopted in Northern Health and the 
regressive approach adopted in Wheen. 
III) QUILTER V THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL 
The case of Quilter is based on same-sex marriages. Three lesbian couples 
wished to get married but were denied a marriage license by the registrar 
under section 23 of the Marriage Act 1955. While the Marriage Act does 
not explicitly outlaw the marriage of same sex couples it was the Attorney 
Generals argument that at the time of its passing it was not intended by 
parliament to allow them. The couples claim that the interpretation the 
Attorney-General wishes to put on the Marriage Act is in breach of section 
19 of the Bill of Rights and that it is possible to interpret the Act in line with 
section 19 and therefore due to section 6 of the Bill of Rights this should be 
done. Thus two main issues arose in the case; could the Marriage Act be 
interpreted to allow same-sex marriages; and if so, would not doing so result 
in section 19 of the Bill of Rights being breached. 
This discussion focuses entirely on the second issue of discrimination. As 
regards to the first issue it is sufficient for this purpose to say that the full 
court held that the Marriage Act could not be interpreted using the 
established rules of interpretation to allow same-sex marriages. Thus it was 
saved under section 4 of the Bill of Rights and whether or not it was 
discriminatory was irrelevant as regards the outcome of the case. Thus it 
could be argued that the findings relating to discrimination where only obiter 
and therefore their influence on future proceedings could be limited. 
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The case was heard before a full coram of judges comprising Richardson P., 
Gault J., Keith J. , Tipping J. and Thomas J. Each of these judgements will 
be examined in turn with the focus being on the process that they used to 
determine whether the interpretation of the Marriage Act prohibiting same-
sex marriages discriminated against gays and therefore breached section 19 
of the Bill of Rights. 
A) Richardson P. 
Richardson P. does not so much write a judgement but rather a confirmation 
of other judges views. He states that the essential question in the case is 
whether the Marriage Act can be read consistently with same-sex marriages, 
and on this issue he agrees with Tipping J. in that it cannot. 
He states that it is ·' ... unnecessary to determine the difficult and complex 
question of the meaning of discrimination under international human rights 
instruments and New Zealand law ."33 However he goes on to record his 
agreement with Keith J and Gault J. that he does not consider that section 19 
requires equal legislative recognition of same-sex and heterosexual 
mamages. 
Therefore any criticism that are directed at the judgements of Keith J. and 
Gault J. must also relate to this judgement. 
B) GaultJ. 
Gault J . also states that the interpretation of the Marriage Act is all that is 
needed to dispose of the appeal and that an examination of discrimination is 
not called for. However he goes on to make sure that people do not mistake 
this view as tacitly accepting that discrimination does arise from the facts but 
is saved by section 4 of the Bill of Rights. Indeed he expressly states that he 
33 AbO\ c n I , 5:26. 
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does not believe that the Marriage Act, read as prohibiting same-sex 
marriages, is discriminatory against homosexuals. He goes on to justify his 
stance by using the formal equality test for discrimination. 
He starts by stating that neither homosexuals nor heterosexuals can legally 
marry a person of the same sex. This he says shows that homosexuals are 
not being discriminated against. By doing this he is stating the right 
supposedly denied by the alleged discrimination as the right to marry 
someone of the opposite sex. However the plaintiffs argument is not that 
they are denied marriage to the opposite sex, but that they are denied the 
right to marry the person of their choice. The law against marrying someone 
of the same sex only has the effect of denying them this right while allowing 
it to heterosexuals . 
Gault J. answers this argument in is next paragraph. He states that the 
" ... denial of choice always effects only those who wish to make the choice. 
It is not for that reason discriminatory:•3-1 But surely to give the right to 
choose to one group of people and deny it to another is to discriminate 
against the group which is denied? It seems as if Gault J. would agree with 
this if the denial was done expressly but not if it was done, as in this case, 
indirectly. He then goes on to state that to differentiate is not necessarily to 
discriminate. For differentiation to amount to discrimination, he says, the 
differentiation must be by reference to a particular characteristic which does 
not justify the different treatment. Therefore it seems that Gault J. considers 
there to be a reasonableness component built into the definition of 
discrimination. 
Gault J. then concludes his discussion of discrimination by stating that in his 
view, the only ground for discrimination is sex, and as sexual discrimination 
is aimed at the gender characteristics of the person , there can be no 
discrimination because regardless of their gender, nobody is able to legally 
34 Abme n 1, 5'27. 
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marry someone of the opposite sex. He also states that due to the traditional 
meaning of marriage, the differentiation it imposes should only be ruled 
unjustifiable (and therefore discriminatory in his view) by parliament. 
C) Keith J. 
The judgement of Keith J. is the most substantial of the three judges 
(Richardson p., Gault J. and Keith J.) who state that discrimination does not 
arise in this case. His judgement states that there are some situations where 
the right to be free from discrimination does not apply, and he says this 
supposedly without invoking sections 4 or 5 of the Bill of Rights. He 
justifies this view by saying first that anti-discrimination laws are 
·' ... understood and applied in a pragmatic, functional way." 35 This he says 
is the general rule that leads to the conclusion that parliament would not have 
intended section 19 to change the law relating to such an established and 
understood institution such as marriage. Moreover he states that using 
section 19- to change the definition of marriage would be a judicial 
'backdoor' legislative action that would alter all of the rights and incidents 
attached to the institution of marriage. 
Keith J. does seem to state that if an investigation into discrimination is to be 
carried out then implicit in it should be a reasonableness test. He states that 
an investigation into whether discrimination exists will '' ... often have to take 
careful account of the context and competing principles and interests."36 
Thus it seems as if Keith J. believes that reasonableness has a part to play in 
two distinct ways; firstly as to whether it is reasonable for the right to extend 
to the situation in question (taking into account parliaments intention) and 
secondly as part of the process of finding whether discrimination exists. 
35 A bo Ye n 1, 556. 
36 Abmc n I , 557. 
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There is a section of the judgement37 where he recognises the differences 
between formal and substantive equality and the different results they would 
bring. He states the interpretation were there is no discrimination because no 
person, whether homosexual or heterosexual , is able to marry someone of 
the same sex and therefore everybody is equal before the law (formal 
equality). He then contrasts this interpretation with the statement that 
perhaps the law should look at the effect (rather than the purpose) of the 
action, and that the effect of the Marriage Act is discriminatory on 
homosexuals. However he does not take this point any further, but rather 
uses it as an example of the 'difficulty' surrounding anti-discrimination law. 
The rest of his judgement on discrimination is mainly an examination of the 
common law and international history of discrimination. He concludes this 
section with the proposition that the Bill of Rights should be seen in the 
international context. He uses this to justify his findings by stating that 
internationally the community does not accept same-sex marriages as 
discriminatory. 
It is apparent that if (as he states) Keith J. does not consider section 5 in his 
reasoning, then his judgement on discrimination is based on a major 
oversight. It may be true that parliament would not have intended section 19 
to change the laws relating to marriage, but that is exactly why section 4 
exists . Thus a declaration from Keith J. that the interpretation of the 
Marriage Act prohibiting same sex marriages is discriminatory would not 
have the result that Keith J. seems to believe it would. It would not effect the 
legal definition of marriage, and it would not consequentially change any of 
the rights and incidents attaching to marriage. Therefore Keith J. is reading 
section 19 as containing far more than it does. It simply contains a right to 
be free from discrimination , it does not require a judicial investigation into 
parliaments intentions. That investigation is done in the interpretation of the 
alleged discriminatory enactment and is applied through sections 4 and 5. 
37 Abmc n 1, 557. 
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Therefore section 19 is not limited in its scope, and to do so is to limit not the 
right, but the very definition of discrimination. Perhaps the best summing up 
of the judgement of Keith J. is given by him at the start of his judgement 
when he states his approach of ignoring sections 4 and 5 of the Bill of Rights 
perhaps" .. .introduces an element of artificiality into this judgement.. ."38 
D) Tipping J. 
The judgement of Tipping J. is best known for its interpretation of the 
Marriage Act which is endorsed by the other four judges. However it is also 
a judgement that contains a substantial opinion on discrimination. His 
discussion of discrimination tarts with section 65 of the Human Rights Act 
dealing with indirect discrimination. This he realises requires an 
examination of the effect of the law on concerned parties. However he goes 
further and notes that section 65 does not give any guidance as to who to 
make the comparison with and states that the should be with " ... another 
person or group whose treatment is logically relevant to the person or group 
al1eging discrimination."39 Thus he endorses the substantive equality and the 
analogous grounds test. 
After noting that not all differentiation will amount to discrimination , 
Tipping J. states that in considering whether discrimination ari e it will be 
necessary to define two things ; the subject matter of the alleged 
discrimination and the basis for the alleged discrimination. He also considers 
it to be a two step approach of first identifying the discrimination and then 
secondly determining whether it is reasonable (this second step he suggests is 
better left to parliament). 
The subject matter of the discrimination depends upon how you define the 
right in question. Tipping J. realises that the definition of the right in 
38 Above n I , 555. 
39 Above n I , 573. 
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question will depend on the ideal of equality you apply. If you look at the 
process of the law (fomial equality) then you will define the right as the right 
to marry some-one of the same-sex, however if you look at the effect that the 
law has (substantive equality) then the right will be defined as the right to 
marry the person of your choice. This definition of the right in turn leads to 
different conclusions regarding whether discrimination exists. Under a 
formal equality ideal no discrimination would be found because no person, 
regardless of sex or sexual orientation (the two possible grounds), can marry 
somebody of the same sex. However, under substantial equality 
discrimination would be found to exist because the right to marry the person 
of your choice would depend on your sexual orientation (the only ground 
possible). 
The question of which test to apply is answered by Tipping J. by reference to 
both section 65 of the Human Rights Act and the spirit of the Bill of Rights 
Act. Section 65 explicitly refers to the cff ect the law has on people and thus 
indicates a substantive approach to equality. The spirit of the Bill of Rights, 
states Tipping J, ·· ... suggests a broad and purposive approach to these 
problems."40 He then goes on to say: 
Such an approach leads to the proposition that i l is prcrcrablc to focus more on the 
impact than on strict analysis. If something (here legislation) has an impact on a 
person or group of persons ,, hich differs from its impact on another person or group 
of persons because of sexual orientation, that difference in impact amounts pnma 
facic lo a difference in treatment and thus discrimination. 
Thus Tipping J. adopts the substantive view of equality and focuses on the 
laws effect on people or groups of people. This leads to his conclusion that 
'·lp Jrima facie therefore r ee the inability of homosexual and le~bian couples 
to marry as involving discrimination against them on the grounds of their 
sexual orientation. 
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It also must be noted that Tipping J. considers that section 5 and the ideas of 
reasonableness and justification have no part to play until after the existence 
of discrimination has been established. In his view this " ... accords more 
with the spirit and purpose of the Bill of Rights. In this kind of case it is 
better to start with a more widely defined rights and legitimise or justify a 
restriction if appropriate, than to start with a more restricted right."-+1 His 
fear is that " . .if restrictions which may be legitimate or justified in some 
circumstances are built into the right itself the risk is that they will apply in 
other circumstances when they are not legitimised or justified."42 
Thus Tipping J. adopts a substantive ideal of equality coupled with an 
analogous grounds test for the identification of discrimination. This is done 
in the first stage of a distinct two stage test where the second stage is an 
application of section 5. He also suggests that section 5 is best left up to 
parliament. 
E) Thomas J. 
Thomas J. starts his judgement by recognising that while it would be possible 
to leave the question of discrimination aside and concentrate on the 
interpretation of the Marriage Act to answer the appeal, it would not be fair 
to the appellants. After stating that he considers international jurisprudence 
to be important, he states his conclusion:-B 
I ha\e concluded that as a matter of law the exclusion of gay and lesbian couples 
rrom the status of marriage is discriminator) and cont,-ai") to s 19 of the Bill of 
Rights. They arc denied the right lo marry the person of their choice in accordance 
\\ ith their sexual orientation. 
40Alxncn 1,575. 
-11 Abmc n l, 576 . 
.. Q A bovc n 1, 576. 
-13 A bovc n I , 5'.28. 
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He then goes on to note that this does not change the outcome of the case as 
it is not possible to interpret the Marriage Act to allow same-sex marriages 
and thus is saved through section 4. He also points to the fact that some 
policy considerations are inherent in the definition of discrimination. 
In justification of his conclusion Thomas J. goes through a long analysis of 
substantive equality and applies it to the facts. He starts off by recognising 
that all people are uniquely individual and hence no two are alike or naturally 
equal. Thus, he says, equal treatment under the law will not necessarily 
result in equal enjoyment of rights and freedoms on an equal footing as a 
result of the law. Therefore equal treatment can quite often result in 
discrimination. However, every distinction created as an effect of the law 
will not amount to discrimination. For a distinction to be discriminatory it 
must be based on a personal characteristic (which falls within the prohibited 
grounds) and must have an effect not imposed on others. He states that as 
the focus is on the impact of the law, discussions of intention and therefore 
direct and indirect discrimination are irrelevant. He then makes a quick 
reference to the reasonableness of the discrimination by rejecting La Forest 
J.'s reasoning in Egan v Canada and Others~ that marriage needs to be 
restricted to opposite-sex couples to allow pro-creation, which is the primary 
purpose of marriage. Thomas J. believes this reason is not applicable in 
today's world and thus any reasonable limitation has disappeared. The 
important point to note from this is that it's obvious that Thomas J. considers 
there to be a reasonableness component built into the definition of 
discrimination in section 19. 
The next step in his analysis is to define the ground on which the 
discrimination is alleged. There are two obvious choices; sex (gender) or 
sexual orientation). Under the ground of sex, Thomas J. recognises that this 
ground may lead to the argument that regardless of an individual's sex no 
one is able to marry a person of the same sex, and therefore no 
-1-4 (1995) l::?.4 DLR 609. 
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discrimination exists. To combat this problem Thomas J. speaks of the right 
of the couple, as a group, to be free from discrimination. Under this view it 
is because they are both of the same sex that they are discriminated against. 
To justify this view Thomas J. has to show that rights can attach to groups as 
well as individuals. He does this by stating that rights do not exist in 
isolation and the right to be free from discrimination is a classic example of 
this right. While he recognises that this view may be controversial in regards 
to large groups, he believes that it certainly applies to couples. Therefore he 
finds that on this analysis the couple is discriminated against due to the law 
prohibiting them from getting married. 
The easier avenue 1s where the grounds for discrimination is sexual 
orientation. The analysis that he follows under this ground is more straight 
forward. First he points out that it is a personal characteristic of 
homosexuals that they choose partners of the same sex. Thus the law 
preventing same sex marriages affects them in a way that it does not effect 
heterosexuals, and denies them the rights and incidents attaching to the legal 
recognition of marriage. Therefore he states that due to this distinction being 
based on a personal characteristic (which is within the prohibited grounds) 
which denies a person or group of persons rights and benefits allowed to 
others it is discriminatory and breaches section 19 of the Bill of Rights. 
He then proceeds to deal with the issue of section 5. Basically he states that 
discrimination under section 19, when found, can never be justified in a free 
and democratic society. He states:~5 
Disc1imination in all of its forms is odious. It is hurtful to those discriminated 
against and harmful to the health of the body politic. As such, it is or should be 
repugnant in a free and democratic socict) . There arc, in other\\ ords, no "reasonable 
limits" prescribed by law which could be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society." 
~5 Abmc n I, 540. 
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However, as we have already seen Thomas J. addresses reasonableness as 
part of the process of discrimination, therefore perhaps he has made section 5 
redundant by this process. If this is not the case then Thomas J's view 
cannot be maintained. Take for example the blind man who is denied the 
right to drive based on the personal characteristic that he is disabled (one of 
the grounds stated in the Human Rights Act). There is no doubt that under 
Thomas J's definition of discrimination (assuming no reasonableness factor) 
the blind man is discriminated against. However, society as a whole and 
probably even the blind man himself would believe that this discrimination is 
completely justifiable and reasonable. But if Thomas J. did not take 
reasonableness into account in his definition of discrimination, he would be 
forced to say that this discrimination is unjustifiable. This example goes 
shows that reasonableness must have a part to play somewhere in the 
analysis, and in Thomas J's judgement it must be in the definition of 
discrimination. 
F) Summary 
To summarise the findings in Quilter, the court held unanimously that same-
sex marriages were not allowed by law because the Marriage Act could not 
be interpreted to allow them. The court also held by 3-2 majority (Tipping J 
and Thomas J dissenting) that discrimination did not arise through this 
interpretation of the Marriage Act. The court used four different tests to 
determine whether discrimination existed; 
• Keith J. (with Richardson P. concurring) held that the right contained in 
section 19 did not extend to same sex marriages. They invoked a two 
stage reasonableness test; firstly is it reasonable for the right to extend to 
the situation and secondly if the right does extend and there is a 
distinction (they do not state whether it should be based on the content or 
effect of the law) is it reasonable? If it is not reasonable then it will 
breach section 19. 
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• Gault J. used a formal equality test for determining whether there was 
discrimination based on the content of the law. Gault J. also believes that 
reasonableness is built in to the definition of discrimination. 
• 
• 
Tipping J. employed a substantive equality test based on analogous 
grounds to test for discrimination. He then stated that any reasonableness 
question should follow later and should be a job for parliament. 
Thomas J. also used a substantive equality test base on analogous 
grounds to determine the existence of discrimination , however he also 
assumes that reasonableness is built into the definition of discrimination. 
Thus it seems that the court on a 4-1 majority (Tipping J. dissenting) held 
that reasonableness is implicit in the meaning of discrimination. By doing 
this they effectively constrict the right to be free from discrimination 
contained in section 19 in the same manner that parliament has constricted 
other rights (such as the right to unreasonable search and seizure contained in 
section 21) protected in Act by explicitly including reasonableness in their 
wording. 
IV) CONCLUSION 
It is the conclusion of this paper that the court in Quilter have not set a good 
foundation for this country 's jurisprudence on discrimination . The approval 
of the formal equality ideal by two of the judges (Richardson P. and Gault J .) 
is disappointing when compared to international thinking. It does not 
achieve the objective of anti-discrimination law which is to ensure equality 
of people as a result of the law . Perhaps even more disturbing is the 
judgement of Gault J. who believes that section 19 must be interpreted to say 
that distinctions are only discrimination when parliament intends them to be. 
Thus the finding of the majority of the court that discrimination does not 
exist in the Marriage Act is as a whole unfortunate. 
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However, two of the judges held that discrimination did exist and both 
followed a substantive view of equality. Tipping J. also used an analogous 
grounds approach which allows the right to be read as broadly as possible 
before restricting it in special circumstances. Thomas J. however differs in 
that he incorporates an element of reasonableness into his definition of 
discrimination therefore limiting the right to begin with. 
Perhaps the most encouraging point about Quilter is that the majority who 
did not recognise discrimination all stated that their discussion on the point 
was not needed to determine the result. Therefore it could be argued that 
their findings should be regarded as obiter only and will not have the sting 
effect of ratio. However this impact is minimal given that it was a full Court 
of Appeal and the judgements were on the most part long and considered. 
Perhaps Thomas J. was right when he stated that ·' ... [t]he majoritarian 
approach was rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States ... as an 
extremely illiberal argument contrary to the basic democratic assumption that 
majorities are not always right. "-16 
-16 A brnc n 1, 545. (Emphasis added). 
VICTORIA 
UNIVERSITY 
OF 
A Fine According to Library WELLINGTON 
Regulations is charged on 
Overdue Books. LIBRARY 
LAW LIBRAR, 
~f 1ijf ~[1li1 ~11111 11~~ l1]~11111[111l1l~1it111f 1i111!1ijf 1j~~ 
3 7212 00576098 6 
e 
AS741 
vuw 
A66 
C948 
1998 
Crook, A 
Legal discrimination 

